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ABSTRACT
Objectives To understand how frontline reports of 
day-to-day care failings might be better translated into 
improvement.
Design Qualitative evaluation of an interdisciplinary team 
intervention capitalising on the frontline experience of 
care delivery. Prospective clinical team surveillance (PCTS) 
involved structured interdisciplinary briefings to capture 
challenges in care delivery, facilitated organisational 
escalation of the issues they identified, and feedback. 
Eighteen months of ethnography and two focus groups 
were conducted with staff taking part in a trial of PCTS.
Results PCTS fostered psychological safety—a 
confidence that the team would not embarrass or punish 
those who speak up. This was complemented by a hard 
edge of accountability, whereby team members would 
regulate their own behaviour in anticipation of future 
briefings. Frontline concerns were triaged to managers, 
or resolved autonomously by ward teams, reversing what 
had been well-established normalisations of deviance. 
Junior clinicians found a degree of catharsis in airing 
their concerns, and their teams became more proactive in 
addressing improvement opportunities. PCTS generated 
tangible organisational changes, and enabled managers 
to make a convincing case for investment. However, 
briefings were constrained by the need to preserve 
professional credibility, and staff found some comfort in 
avoiding accountability . At higher organisational levels, 
frontline concerns were subject to competition with other 
priorities, and their resolution was limited by the scale of 
the challenges they described.
Conclusions Prospective safety strategies relying on 
staff-volunteered data produce acceptable, negotiated 
accounts, subject to the many interdisciplinary tensions 
that characterise ward work. Nonetheless, these strategies 
give managers access to the realities of frontline cares, 
and support frontline staff to make incremental changes 
in their daily work. These are goals for learning healthcare 
organisations.
Trial registration ISRCTN 34806867.
INTRODUCTION
Around 10% of hospitalised patients suffer 
preventable harms.1 2 Many are the result 
of persistent organisational failings, either 
deliberately ignored, or to which the organ-
isation has become blind.3 Frontline staff 
have a unique insight into these failings in 
day-to-day care, identifying safety and quality 
concerns in the course of their routine 
work.4–7 Their concerns—revealing uncom-
fortable institutional fallibilities—are not 
reflected in high-level organisational metrics. 
Rather, frontline insights into everyday 
processes are ‘soft data’, adding a nuanced 
understanding that can build more holistic 
improvement strategies.8
Senior healthcare leaders acknowledge the 
importance of this frontline knowledge—yet 
those same leaders are loath to spend time 
and resources pursuing staff concerns that 
might ultimately prove to be trivial.9 Few 
safety campaigns focus on the tribulations of 
frontline workers.10 11 Instead, staff typically 
devise their own workarounds for operational 
problems, producing temporary fixes. This 
‘first-order’ problem solving is effective in the 
moment—but it does little to prevent each 
problem’s recurrence, and organisational 
processes go unchanged.12–14
Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► Qualitative evaluations of complex interventions are 
recommended by the Medical Research Council.
 ► This study identified the mechanisms to be replicated 
if further prospective clinical team surveillance 
implementation efforts are to prove successful.
 ► The evaluation highlighted tensions when trying to 
capture the frontline experience of care delivery; 
previous reports had characterised frontline data 
collection as a more objective exercise.
 ► Selection bias may reduce the internal validity of our 
findings: there was disproportionate access to staff 
who engaged with the intervention.
 ► As a single-site study, the generalisability of the 
results may be limited.
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‘Prospective clinical surveillance’ is one mechanism 
for improving care delivery from a frontline perspec-
tive. Embedded observers (or visiting facilitators) work 
with frontline staff to record their experiences of care 
delivery and its consequences, with a structure to support 
data capture.2 15 16 Documenting potentially flawed care 
processes and adverse events, prospective clinical surveil-
lance can produce detailed, unit-level performance 
assessments in near-real time.17 It is ‘prospective’ in two 
respects. First, it proactively seeks out staff concerns, 
rather than waiting for staff to volunteer them. Second, 
it can identify care deficiencies that have not yet led to 
patient harm. However, its effectiveness as an improve-
ment strategy is unclear. Whether prospective clinical 
surveillance translates staff concerns into tangible action, 
and how exactly it might do so, have not previously been 
explored.
Here, we investigate the qualitative impact of prospec-
tive clinical team surveillance (PCTS), a novel extension 
of this technique. PCTS had three components: (i) struc-
tured interdisciplinary briefings to capture frontline 
clinical and administrative challenges; (ii) facilitated 
organisational escalation of the issues they identified and 
(iii) feedback. PCTS was evaluated in a cluster controlled 
trial on medical wards, involving seven interdisciplinary 
teams from two London (UK) hospitals.18 High fidelity 
PCTS reduced excess length of stay; it also improved 
teamwork and safety climates, and incident reporting.19 
Lower fidelity implementation may have had a detri-
mental impact on team performance. In this study, we 
seek to describe the intervention’s effects as understood 
and enacted by participating staff.
METHODS
Intervention
The intervention is described in detail in the published 
protocol.18 In brief, structured briefings reviewed the 
events of the previous shift, identifying clinical and 
administrative challenges and concluding with a plan to 
resolve or escalate those concerns. A structured pro forma 
(Hospital Event Analysis Describing Significant Unantic-
ipated Problems (HEADS-UP)) focused on the problems 
most commonly identified on medical wards.20 After a 
short period of supervision, ward teams led their own 
briefings autonomously. A single facilitator helped teams 
advance the issues raised in their briefings, and provided 
follow-up and feedback to stakeholders throughout the 
organisation. Briefings were known locally as ‘HEADS-UP 
briefings’. The autonomous team briefings were intended 
to be a sustainable local alternative to the facilitator-led 
data capture described in previous reports.2 16
Process evaluation
This study was grounded in the Medical Research Council 
framework for process evaluations of complex interven-
tions.21 Qualitative methods identify the complex causal 
pathways and unexpected mechanisms of impact by 
which these interventions produce change. Ethnography 
and focus groups are recommended for this type of inves-
tigation:22 they are used here to evaluate the intervention 
at the hospital site most heavily involved in the primary 
study.
Embedded research and auto-ethnography
The programme lead was an embedded researcher at the 
institution contributing six of the seven study wards. This 
position is defined as ‘work(ing) inside (a) host organi-
sation as (a) member of staff, while also maintaining an 
affiliation with an academic institution… conduct(ing) 
research studies… which respond to the needs of the 
organisation, and accord with its unique context and 
culture’.23 Relationships between staff and the researcher 
are important: the researcher is seen both to be part of 
the team and contributing to the research capacity of the 
host organisation.24 Fieldnotes, typed contemporaneously 
as soon as was practicable, recorded personal exchanges 
with staff, changes arising from PCTS, governance 
proceedings and reflections on the broader context. 
These ‘auto-ethnographic’ insights have been widely used 
in organisational case study research, providing broad 
accounts of culture and practice.25–27
Focus groups
Semi-structured focus groups were undertaken in July 
2015. The topics of interest were specific attitudes, feel-
ings and beliefs that would best be revealed through 
social interactions between group participants.28 The 
topic guide explored PCTS as a tool, as well as the imple-
mentation process that introduced it. To orientate them, 
participants were asked to discuss existing systems for 
identifying team concerns and improving patient care. 
They then reflected on their experiences of using PCTS. 
Questions and follow-up probes scrutinised team-wide 
involvement in PCTS; whether it affected perceptions 
of the ward’s safety and quality; how it was used in staff 
interactions and whether changes had been made as a 
result. Topic guide questions were reviewed and piloted 
within the research team, and with researchers in health-
care quality and safety who had not been involved with 
the study previously. The focus groups were advertised in 
clinical areas, by email and in person; all ward staff were 
invited to attend. Certain staff groups were purposively 
targeted to ensure that key stakeholders (junior doctors, 
senior nurses and service managers) were represented. 
Focus groups lasted approximately 2 hours, facilitated by 
experienced qualitative researchers (NS, MJJ, SA; also Dr 
Louise Hull (Research Fellow) and Ms Tayana Soukup 
(Research Assistant)), using the topic guide flexibly in 
view of the different roles and experiences within the two 
groups. Focus group discussions were digitally recorded 
in the hospital’s medical education centre, and then 
professionally transcribed.
Focus group transcripts and fieldnotes were managed 
with NVivo software (QSR International, Doncaster, 
Australia). Two researchers (SP, SA) read and reread the 
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source material, adopting an inductive (theory-generating) 
approach.29 This type of analysis is a flexible research 
tool, generating a rich and detailed account of a complex 
data set. It can be applied to focus groups as well as other 
qualitative data,30–32 allowing thematic integration in a 
single analysis. Each researcher coded transcripts individ-
ually, generating an initial coding frame, which was then 
discussed and refined. The transcripts were coded again, 
before a group of higher order themes was agreed. Field 
notes were searched for evidence to support or contradict 
the evidence from the focus groups, and for themes not 
covered independently by focus group discussions. Themes 
were inspected against the broader literature to inform 
their interpretation. The study was approved by research 
and development authorities at participating institutions 
as a quality improvement programme. Focus group partic-
ipants gave their signed consent. The primary study was 
registered with the ISRCTN registry (ISRCTN34806867).
RESULTS
Fifteen staff participated in the focus groups: three 
junior doctors (foundation doctors, in their first 2 years 
of medical practice), eight senior ward nurses and four 
non-clinical managers. Participants represented each of 
the clinical divisions that had taken part in the study at this 
hospital (care of the elderly, acute medicine, respiratory 
medicine and gastroenterology). Focus group data were 
supplemented by 44 pages of auto-ethnographic field-
notes, documenting the 18-month period in which links 
were established with clinicians; clinical and non-clinical 
managers and senior hospital leaders.
Our findings are organised around four themes. First, 
we describe the shared team beliefs and ethos estab-
lished by PCTS. Second, we discuss how teams used the 
programme to triage ward problems more effectively. 
Third, we identify how individuals’ practice changed as 
a result of their participation. Finally, we note how PCTS 
altered team and organisational approaches to improve-
ment, and the tangible changes that came about.
PCTS established psychological safety, with a hard edge of 
accountability
By the end of the study period, all staff groups had partic-
ipated in—and led—HEADS-UP briefings:
(Consultants) contribute as much as anyone else (…) 
so their voice is being heard, because they suffer from 
the same frustrations as all of us. (Service manager)
The physio(therapists) or the OTs (occupational 
therapists) are also flagging things up, that’s how 
we found it useful. (…) The discharges that did not 
happen, anyone (who) deteriorated (…) we all learn 
from what went wrong. (Senior nurse)
Perhaps because different staff groups were perceived as 
partners in them, the briefings formed a psychologically 
safe environment in which problems could be discussed 
openly, without fear of retribution. Team psychological 
safety does not imply undue permissiveness or unre-
lenting cheeriness, but a confidence that the team will 
not embarrass or punish someone for speaking up:
It was more of a constructive exercise, where 
everyone is then wanting the same outcome, so it 
wasn’t like, “Oh this didn’t happen, I am angry at 
you”, it was more like we are all actually in the same 
team (…) You all have the same end point and I think 
that is why it is quite safe to bring it up, because it 
is not confrontational, and it is not personal against 
someone, it is just what needs to be done. (Foundation 
doctor)
The style and timeliness of PCTS feedback also contrib-
uted to a sense that this was a non-judgemental forum for 
team learning:
There were a few teaching sessions where (…) we 
went through things like ECGs (electrocardiographs) 
that were missed, and then you had a collective 
opportunity to think (…) It was a very good plot for 
learning, saying this happened and let’s do some 
learning and try and prevent it happening again. 
That is quite helpful. (Foundation doctor)
This psychological safety was not limitless: there were still 
boundaries around what could be discussed. Although the 
briefings did prompt teams to consider positive notes from 
the previous shift, they rarely did so. Reflections often high-
lighted the overall management of patient flow, rather than 
specific actions or diagnostic processes that others could 
emulate. This reflected a reluctance to delve too deeply 
into any one team member’s performance. Professional 
identities were protected by assigning problems to other 
departments, acknowledging procedural complications 
as foreseeable, or linking delays to understaffing. In this 
way, perceived threats to professional identity were largely 
deflected by a projection of blame onto other groups, or 
attributed to circumstances beyond the team’s control.
More introspective teams, with senior support and 
increasing psychological safety, did record issues like 
diagnostic errors, in which they had played a more overt 
role. However, even in those teams—where the briefings 
were implemented with greatest fidelity—there could be 
disputes as to whether certain problems were really prob-
lems at all:
The senior nurse disagrees with medical teams’ 
perceptions that the site moves (moving patients 
from one ward to another) were inappropriate. 
She thinks doctors expect patients to remain on 
the acute medical unit even when they are stable… 
She felt an inadequate handover perpetuated their 
concerns.’(Fieldnotes)
Thus, while psychological safety was an important factor 
in helping staff speak up about their concerns, certain 
topics remained off-limits, and psychological safety did 
not guarantee agreement about what were reasonable 
concerns. These are important limitations:
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I think it’s more (than) just raising the issue. (…) 
Give me a more detailed timeframe, resolution, how 
do you resolve it? Are you going to get back to me 
because it’s important? And what will I expect? (Senior 
nurse)
Where they were most effective, the briefings main-
tained a ‘hard edge’: team members regulated their own 
behaviour, knowing that their actions (or inactions) might 
be flagged up at the next briefing, or in feedback. Junior 
doctors and nurses were conscious of this internalised 
discipline (panopticism), acknowledging how it changed 
their own behaviour and how they could use it to their 
advantage. A self-reinforcing virtuous cycle emerged, with 
participation, accountability and feedback:
The group was more aware that if you perhaps missed 
something like that, it may be brought up later 
at a HEADS-UP meeting. (…) It made you more 
accountable. (Foundation doctor)
It certainly works for the VTEs [venous 
thromboembolism assessments, completed by junior 
doctors, often at the behest of nursing staff]. There 
are days that we will have eight or 10 VTEs (to do), 
so if I (…) give the list to the doctor, the following 
day (…) there will be one or two, because they know 
(…) it will be mentioned again, with the consultant. 
(Senior nurse)
You get more feedback, so you raise concern(s), and 
then maybe the next day the same issue would crop 
up, and you actually then get feedback on what they 
are doing about it, or who they have escalated to. 
(Foundation doctor)
As we will now describe, airing and recording concerns 
in this environment helped triage those problems, 
directing them back to frontline teams or onwards to 
their managers.
Rapid resolution and meaningful managerial follow-up
To explain their perceptions of PCTS, focus group partic-
ipants drew comparisons with the existing processes 
for identifying and resolving ward-level problems. The 
hospital’s online incident reporting system was consid-
ered the formal mechanism by which problems were 
recorded. The system was not easy to use for this purpose, 
and there were few attempts to persistently report recur-
rent problems. As a result, commonplace issues were no 
longer even considered abnormal—a materialisation of 
normalised deviance, where staff become so desensitised 
to deviant practice that it no longer feels wrong:
Some things staff have got so used to that they don’t 
(report) it. So it’s just become common practice. 
(Clinical risk manager)
Managers too were frustrated by the incident reporting 
system. Reports did not necessarily illuminate what 
was happening at the frontline. Moreover, long delays 
in processing those incident reports meant that even 
relatively simple problems were not reviewed for many 
weeks. As a result, reports that described patient harm 
were prioritised: where no harm had occurred, little was 
done. Service managers were aware that they paid atten-
tion to only the most serious incidents:
You could go down there (to the ward) and you could 
see people working very, very hard and you could also 
sense a lot of frustrations (…) but you weren’t getting 
to what those frustrations were, and what those issues 
were. (Service manager)
It has got to that point of being a SI (serious 
incident, an adverse event with particularly grave 
consequences) before it is then addressed and taught 
and learnt from. (Service manager)
In contrast, PCTS helped identify a route for more rapid 
resolution of practical problems. It provided an accept-
able mechanism for staff to log issues into which they had 
immediate insight. This was a materialisation of second-
order problem solving, staff finding a way to bring about 
a more lasting solution to each issue they encountered. 
Where issues could not be resolved within the ward team, 
managers were presented with clear, actionable topics to 
address. Those managers were then better prepared to 
handle incipient risks to service quality:
(PCTS) highlighted little things, that could be sorted 
out quite quickly. It made sure that somebody was 
allocated to deal with that on the day—or did you 
follow that through, did that get sorted out? So 
everything benefits, rather than just going on and 
on and on (…) Things get sorted out quicker. (Senior 
nurse)
What I like about it is (that) it is instant and it is 
thematic very quickly, you understand what the issues 
are (…) Here is an opportunity to dump them (your 
daily issues) and suddenly a picture forms out of it 
(…) And not just here, but there, there, there and 
there (…) And it hasn’t yet created a significant 
incident, but clearly there is risk associated with it. 
(Service manager)
Therefore, PCTS brought about faster resolution of 
safety and quality issues through a combination of mech-
anisms. First, increasing self-monitoring within ward 
teams helped anticipate and mitigate potential prob-
lems. Second, senior ward staff at the daily briefings were 
more quickly aware of issues they could resolve, without 
having to trawl through a backlog of outstanding incident 
reports. Third, facilitation drew out thematic problems 
across departments, bringing them to the attention of 
middle managers who had struggled to understand the 
difficulties experienced by their staff. Fourth, the clin-
ical impact of these problems was made clearer to senior 
executives, who were motivated by these novel frontline 
narratives to pursue change:
PCTS findings informed the discussion in the Trust 
morbidity and mortality meeting, chaired by the 
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chief executive, highlighting areas which needed 
faster examination and transformation, and bringing 
genuinely new information… Many of these concerns 
had not been formally addressed either in incident 
reports or top-down initiatives… It also highlighted 
new targets for improvement. (Fieldnotes)
However, not all managers were equally enthused. Where 
PCTS had not provided data that appeared directly 
useful for them, middle managers did less to hold their 
service areas accountable for briefing implementa-
tion. Board members questioned how best to detect a 
meaningful signal among the noise of staff reporting 
(whether through formal incident reports or PCTS). At 
times, managers seemed nihilistic about the possibility 
of improvement, or questioned whether their frontline 
teams truly understood the problems they had reported:
We have two chances of getting (this issue resolved)—
fat chance and no chance! We are monitoring (this) 
on a daily basis but (…) the situation is far from ideal 
and we have escalated up the chain – not that it has 
helped. (Support service manager—Fieldnotes)
I would like to get some feedback on (these issues) 
first (…) Currently they are only perception(s), 
and following investigation it may be that the risk 
changes, or the issue is solely around communication 
of processes already in place. (General manager—
Fieldnotes)
Still, the combination of increased frontline efficiency 
and managerial involvement (at least in some areas) led 
to a more general sense that things had changed for the 
better:
(PCTS) would make it clear what was actually 
deficient. And then I think things did start to change, 
and you did see the feedback coming through 
(…) So you could definitely see the evolution of it. 
(Foundation doctor)
There (are) also the (…) day-to-day things within the 
team that start running better, and I think you do start 
seeing those, but it is harder to put a specific, “This 
was raised, this was done, there was an outcome.” 
It is a more (…) general change as part of (PCTS). 
(Foundation doctor)
With a structure in place to coordinate frontline teams 
and their managers, individual staff found their own prac-
tice changing, with unexpected personal benefits. These 
will now be discussed in more detail.
Changing individuals: reversing normalised deviance, and 
catharsis
PCTS prompted staff to proactively address issues they 
may have previously ignored. This was, in effect, a reversal 
of the normalised deviance that had become so ingrained:
You wouldn’t have identified that (issue) necessarily, 
because it is just part of your daily (…) life in the 
NHS, but when it is put like this (with PCTS), it is 
highlighted, you have got an opportunity to really do 
something about it. (Service manager)
This particular patient (has been) awaiting 
echo(cardiography) for the last three days (…) (I) 
would now question why is it still not done (…) When 
I wasn’t doing (the briefings), I wasn’t seeing the 
importance (…) (Now) I tell the Matron, or I tell my 
Bed Manager […] or I go there myself (…) I go to the 
department and ask them, “This is what’s happening, 
this is what I need.” (Senior nurse)
Having made those problems visible once again, the infor-
mation shared in the HEADS-UP briefings would be used 
to actively coordinate plans and decisions for the next 
shift. Aware of pressures on their colleagues, and cogni-
sant that problems were occurring repeatedly, individuals 
would change their routines:
I tell the physio(therapist) and the OT (occupational 
therapist): “These are your priorities for today, these 
are your priorities for tomorrow.” So they already 
have a plan (…) Like I said, it gives you the structure 
that you need. (Senior nurse)
The group as a whole became more “present” to 
(what) happens maybe a couple of times in a week 
(…) For example if the nursing staff are short (…) 
just having that in your mind and thinking “No, 
we need to get all these blood tests done now”, you 
would appreciate how the service could be best run. I 
think that made it more efficient. (Foundation doctor)
The improved information sharing, interdisciplinary 
coordination and efforts to evenly distribute work-
load produced a more supportive team climate. In this 
atmosphere, the briefings could become unexpectedly 
cathartic, giving a voice to junior clinicians to air their 
personal worries, as well as their clinical concerns:
You felt like you had got a lot of your chest by doing 
it (…) The next day you could say, “These are the 
things that went wrong yesterday”, and now I can 
clear that and start again. (Foundation doctor)
(It) makes you feel more heard, because otherwise 
you are just venting your concern, but you don’t 
know if it has been actioned in any way. And then you 
can provide the objective evidence to move forward, 
to change something. (Foundation doctor)
The combination of changes in team ethos, triage and 
individual practice ultimately provoked a new approach 
to improvement, and a degree of organisational develop-
ment.
Changing teams and the organisation
Contrary to some leaders’ fears, PCTS did not reduce the 
volume of formal incident reports. Rather, it provoked new 
reports, and altered how those reports were addressed. 
Yet the translation of briefing-recorded incidents into 
online reports was imperfect, not least because there was 
no agreed list of high-priority events to be recorded:
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Antibiotics had not been given (…) The junior 
doctors had not seen the procedure report specifying 
they were needed. No incident report was done, even 
though (the registrar) specifically asked if one should 
be completed. (Fieldnotes)
When incidents were reported, PCTS briefings allowed 
incident investigators to start to collect relevant informa-
tion. The problems that had provoked the incident were 
typically captured by the briefing, giving the investigator 
(often the nurse in charge) a head start in understanding 
what had happened:
The people involved are already there, they are 
already able to explain to you, “This is what actually 
happened from our end.” (…) It’s easier for you to do 
your incident (investigation) report already because 
as the investigator you don’t have to call everyone. 
(Senior nurse)
The emphasis on clinical teams’ accountability also led 
to a subtler change in incident management. Teams 
took responsibility for issues that were actually within 
their power to change, rather than awaiting permission 
or hoping that the problems would be resolved else-
where:
Very often before it gets to me, it has been dealt with 
and sorted out by the teams themselves (…) With 
HEADS-UP and (incident reporting) together, there 
is a different approach: (…) “We have discussed it, 
we have taken on the responsibility of this, we have 
done as much of this as we can, but here is the point 
where it has to be escalated and we want to make 
sure something is done about it, and this is our 
methodology for doing it.” That is how it feels to me, 
anyway. (Service manager)
At multiple levels within the organisation, it was clear 
that this programme had revealed hidden gaps in prac-
tice. PCTS proved useful even on wards where teams were 
already thought to be functioning well:
There is definitely time to do it, there is definitely a 
need to do it, but (…) you only know that once you 
have done it. (Service manager)
I don’t think we would have known, unless we had 
done it, that there was a gap there. (Senior nurse)
Similarly, in safety and governance meetings, PCTS find-
ings highlighted new areas for improvement, many of 
which had not been addressed in incident reports or 
top-down initiatives. Those findings enabled managers to 
make a convincing case for investment, with numerous 
specific, tangible changes driven by PCTS during the 
study period [box 1]. These changes were described as 
‘quick wins’ by senior managers, with clinicians agreeing 
that they were at least a relatively rapid organisational 
response:
It empowers me then as manager for that area to go 
forward with a business case with the evidence to say 
we need additional resource, this is the implications 
of it (…) And it works, so we have an additional 
(cardiac) sonographer (…) I think we saw very 
quickly a reduction in delays once that was sorted. 
(Service manager)
However, internal investment was not necessarily targeted 
specifically to participating teams. For example, expan-
sion of the phlebotomy service (identified through PCTS 
as no longer meeting patient needs) primarily benefited 
non-participant wards, which were deemed by senior 
management to be more in need of support. Nor was 
progress guaranteed by repeated ward-level reporting. 
Changes to structures or processes were more likely when 
there was an associated financial target; another organisa-
tional incentive aligning with the proposed improvement 
and when clinicians and managers agreed the need for 
change.
Additionally, some of the concerns raised by frontline 
staff simply could not be addressed within the organisa-
tion. Poor staffing levels, for example, were felt keenly, 
but reflected a broader national challenge. Creative 
workarounds and mitigation plans could only go so far 
in addressing a fundamental shortfall in staff numbers. 
This was frustrating for the teams completing the brief-
ings. PCTS also identified issues like unsafe inter-hospital 
transfers, whose resolution would have required close 
collaboration within a network of hospitals. With many 
other competing priorities, a local improvement effort 
was no guarantor of the necessary cooperative drive for 
change.
DISCUSSION
PCTS established a basis of team psychological safety, 
married with a hard edge of accountability. Ward teams 
triaged recurrent problems to their managers, or 
resolved them autonomously, reversing normalised devi-
ance through non-judgemental facilitation and feedback. 
Junior clinicians found a degree of catharsis, and teams 
became more proactive in addressing improvement 
Box 1 Examples of service investment and organisational 
change arising from PCTS
Cost-neutral re-alignment of porter provision for radiology, doubling 
the in-patient flow for X-rays
Re-evaluation of phlebotomy service provision, ultimately generating a 
£20 000 investment in an expanded support service
Additional phlebotomy training for healthcare assistants, delivered 
internally
Additional sonographer in echocardiography
Relocation of intravenous infusion and nasogastric feeding pumps to a 
central equipment library
Development of electronic referrals and electronic reporting for 
medical specialty consultations, using existing electronic health record
£5000 investment in ketone meters for management of diabetic 
ketoacidosis.
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opportunities. The soft intelligence provided through 
PCTS proved effective in generating tangible organi-
sational change—although unpredictably, dependent 
on the hospital’s other priorities and incentives. At the 
ward level, briefings were limited by the need to preserve 
professional credibility, a lack of interdisciplinary 
consensus about the nature of the problems they were 
seeing and the relative comfort afforded by the avoidance 
of accountability. At higher organisational levels, front-
line concerns were subject to competition with other 
priorities, and resolution was limited by the full scale of 
the challenges they described.
To our knowledge, this report is the first qualitative 
analysis of how this type of interdisciplinary intervention 
might generate improved outcomes. Previous observa-
tional studies of prospective clinical surveillance had 
portrayed staff as objective data recorders: how they might 
actively shape, frame and mitigate safety concerns was not 
considered. Our current study therefore offers two novel 
contributions. First, it identifies the mechanisms to be 
replicated if other PCTS implementation efforts are to 
prove successful. Second, it highlights the innate tensions 
within these efforts to capitalise on the frontline experi-
ence of care delivery.
There are multiple sources of friction in organisational 
learning. For example, when reporting their concerns, 
staff portray ‘others’ as threatening patient safety, rather 
than jeopardising their own credibility.33 34 Disputes about 
appropriate care are common, not least because there 
are multiple interpretations of what the right course of 
action should have been.35 36 These distinctions are lost 
as concerns are escalated through an organisation: rich 
narratives about patient safety events are progressively 
sanitised of their context.34 Thus, while senior executives 
are encouraged to obtain ‘first-hand knowledge of the 
system’,37 there is no single unproblematic version of the 
reality of frontline care, however we seek to understand 
it. One study of executive walkrounds (visits to the ‘shop 
floor’) suggested that these visits, whether announced or 
unexpected, necessarily revealed partial, biased accounts 
of what was going on.38 Here too, we found that our 
structured programme to characterise frontline care 
was subject to interdisciplinary (and clinicomanagerial) 
disputes and tensions. Prospective clinical surveillance 
has been described as ‘the future of measuring patient 
safety’.17 We would now argue that these systems are as 
value-laden and subjective as any other attempt to under-
stand frontline care delivery.
Limitations of this study include our disproportionate 
access to the teams and individuals who engaged with 
PCTS. These enthusiasts may have had a more positive 
view of the programme than the wider group of eligible 
clinicians and managers. Selection bias has hampered 
mixed methods evaluations of other quality improve-
ment interventions.39 We attempted to counteract this 
bias with focus group facilitators who had not been 
directly involved in delivering the PCTS programme, and 
searched for conflicting opinions in the group transcripts 
and fieldnotes. Our results may also have been influ-
enced by social desirability bias—participants giving the 
acceptable ‘right’ answers rather than revealing their true 
thoughts—and may not generalise fully to other settings. 
Nonetheless, our findings are consistent with, and 
build on, the existing understanding of frontline safety 
engagement.40 Strengths of the study include the theoret-
ically informed analysis of an emergent safety surveillance 
strategy, and dual methods allowing themes to be inte-
grated. The embedded research model produced good 
access to managers as well as frontline staff: often, there is 
a trade-off between the two. Importantly, the study identi-
fied mechanisms by which frontline concerns can be used 
productively, rather than disappearing into an organisa-
tional ‘black hole’13 from which they generate no change 
or learning.
CONCLUSIONS
Healthcare systems can only improve with a detailed 
operational understanding of how care actually takes 
place.41 Prospective clinical surveillance strategies offer 
a route to this understanding. These strategies are not 
merely novel measurement tools, as they have been 
described15–17, even if they do get closer to the realities 
of frontline care than other safety systems. They still 
produce negotiated, acceptable accounts, subject to the 
many interdisciplinary tensions that characterise ward 
work. Nonetheless, prospective surveillance strategies—
through which system flaws are mitigated as they become 
apparent—facilitate continuous safety improvement. 
They foster improvement by making soft data intelligible 
to healthcare managers, and by supporting frontline staff 
to make incremental changes in their daily work—a goal 
for learning healthcare organisations.
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